Introduction Representatives from Mexico, the USA and Canada met in Alberta, Canada, to examine the impact of scientific change on society and its governance. By intention, many points raised cut across the specific introductory topics. The report groups the resulting discussion under six broad themes:
Historical Background Philosophers who study the social character of scientific knowledge can trace their lineage at least as far as John Stuart Mill. Mill, Charles Sanders Peirce, and Karl Popper all took some type of critical interaction among persons as central to the validation of knowledge claims.
Mill's arguments occur in his well-known political essay On Liberty, Mill rather than in the context of his logical and methodological writings, but he makes it clear that they are to apply to any kind of knowledge or truth claim.
Mill argues from the fallibility of human knowers to the necessity of unobstructed opportunity for and practice of the critical discussion of ideas.
Only such critical discussion can assure us of the justifiability of the true beliefs we do have and can help us avoid falsity or the partiality of belief or opinion framed in the context of just one point of view.
Critical interaction maintains the freshness of our reasons and is instrumental in the improvement of both the content and the reasons of our beliefs.
The achievement of knowledge, then, is a social or collective, not an individual, matter. Peirce's contribution to the social epistemology of science is commonly taken to be his consensual theory of truth: Whatever the correct reading of this particular statement, Peirce elsewhere makes it clear that, in his view, truth is both attainable and beyond the reach of any individual.
Peirce puts great stock in instigating doubt and critical interaction as means to knowledge.
Thus, whether his theory of truth is consensualist or realist, his view of the practices by which we attain it grants a central place to dialogue and social interaction.
Popper is often treated as a precursor of social epistemology because of his emphasis on the importance of criticism in the development of scientific knowledge.
Two concepts of criticism are found in his works Popperand these can be described as logical and practical senses of falsification. The logical sense of falsification is just the structure of a modus tollens argument, in which a hypothesis is falsified by the demonstration that one of its logical consequences is false.
This is one notion of criticism, but it is a matter of formal relations between statements.
|Science and technology studies - Wikipedia||Historical Background Philosophers who study the social character of scientific knowledge can trace their lineage at least as far as John Stuart Mill.|
|Social construction of technology Social constructions are human created ideas, objects, or events created by a series of choices and interactions. Some examples of social construction include class, race, money, and citizenship.|
The practical sense of falsification refers to the efforts of scientists to demonstrate the inadequacies of one another's theories by demonstrating observational shortcomings or conceptual inconsistencies. This is a social activity.
For Popper the methodology of science is falsificationist in both its logical and practical senses, and science progresses through the demonstration by falsification of the untenability of theories and hypotheses. Popper's logical falsificationism is part of an effort to demarcate genuine science from pseudo science, and has lost its plausibility as a description of scientific methodology as the demarcation project has come under challenge from naturalist and historicist approaches in philosophy of science.
While criticism does play an important role in some current approaches in social epistemology, Popper's own views are more closely approximated by evolutionary epistemology, especially that version that treats cognitive progress as the effect of selection against incorrect theories and hypotheses.
In contrast to Mill's views, for Popper the function of criticism is to eliminate false theories rather than to improve them.
The work of Mill, Peirce, and Popper is a resource for philosophers presently exploring the social dimensions of scientific knowledge.
However, the current debates are framed in the context of developments in both philosophy of science and in history and social studies of science following the collapse of the logical empiricist consensus.
The philosophers of the Vienna Circle are conventionally associated with an uncritical form of positivism and with the logical empiricism that replaced American pragmatism in the s and s.
According to some recent scholars, however, they saw natural science as a potent force for progressive social change. Cartwright, Cat, and Chang ; Giere and Richardson, eds.
While one development of this point of view leads to scientism, the view that any meaningful question can be answered by the methods of science; another development leads to inquiry into what social conditions promote the growth of scientific knowledge. Logical empiricism, the version of Vienna Circle philosophy that developed in the United States, focused on logical, internal aspects of scientific knowledge and discouraged philosophical inquiry into the social dimensions of science.
These came into prominence again after the publication of Thomas Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions Kuhn A new generation of sociologists of science, among them Barry Barnes, Steven Shapin, and Harry Collins, took Kuhn's emphasis on the role of non-evidential community factors in scientific change even further than he had and argued that scientific judgment was determined by social factors, such as professional interests and political ideologies BarnesShapinCollins This family of positions provoked a counter-response among philosophers.
These responses are marked by an effort to acknowledge some social dimensions to scientific knowledge while at the same time maintaining its epistemological legitimacy, which they take to be undermined by the new sociology. At the same time, features of the organization of scientific inquiry compel philosophers to consider their implications for the normative analysis of scientific practices.
Big Science, Trust, and Authority The second half of the twentieth century saw the emergence of what has come to be known as Big Science:Technoscience is a subset of Science, Technology, and Society studies that focuses on the inseparable connection between science and technology.
It states that fields are linked and grow together, and scientific knowledge requires an infrastructure of technology in order to remain stationary or move forward. DECLARATION ON SCIENCE AND THE USE OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE. Text adopted by the World Conference on Science 1 July Definitive version.
Preamble 1. should give recognition to the key role of scientific research in the acquisition of knowledge, in the training of scientists and in the education of the public. Scientific . Study of the social dimensions of scientific knowledge encompasses the effects of scientific research on human life and social relations, the effects of social relations and values on scientific research, and the social aspects of inquiry itself.
Work on the role of science in society encompasses both general models of the public authority. Using data from a national survey of South Koreans, this study explores the role of science communication in enhancing three different forms of scientific knowledge (factual, .
Society is uninfluenced by advances in scientific knowledge.
Advances in scientific knowledge can be beneficial to society if applied responsibly best describes the role of scientific knowledge in society.
Richard Feynman on the Role of Scientific Culture in Modern Society And that the knowledge is just to put into correct framework the wonder that nature is. He goes on to take a jab at just how unscientific pop culture is — and how culturally condoned certain unscientific beliefs are.